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$eparateAccommodationsfor Whiles andBlacks.
It is settled that depot agents have the power, as incident to the
office, to make reasonable regulations as to the conduct of business at
their depots, unless restricted, limited or controlled in that respect. It
is not unlawful to provide separate accommodations for whiites and blacks
if such accommodations are equally comfortable and decent.
The action was brought by 1 ebecca Smith against Daniel H. Chamberlain, receiver of the South Carolina Railway Company, to recover
damages for being ejected from a certain room in the Graniteville Station,
where she had gone to buya ticket. An incidental question as to pleading
may be pai-sed by. The facts that raise the main question in the case
appear in the charge of the Court below and in the opinion of the
Supreme Court, and are, briefly, that the plaintiff-was requested to leave
the waiting-room she had entered and go to another; that she refused,
and that she was in consequence ejected. There were contentions in her
behalf that the respective waiting-rooms were not equal in comfort, anc
that in the absence of ratification by the company the station agent had
no right to make arrangements for separating blacks from whites.
Judgment for defendant. - Appealed; judgment affirmed.'

Opinion by MC

wAN, J.

The classification of mankind by the owners or controllers of public places and institutions for the convenience
of all concerned is a long-prevailing and generally-accepted
custom. Girls' schools and boys' schools, women's and
men's entrances and conveniences at hotels, their separate
rooms at railroad stations, on ferryboats and in restaurants
are to be seen every day. These restrictions upon the
individual rights of the citizen, greater in some cases (as
1

Reported in 17 Southeastern Reporter, 37r."
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at a school where no male can receive instruction), less -in
others (as in a ladies' room at a station, where a man may
go but may not smoke), do not render the classified people
unequal before the law or in their liberty to pursue happiness. They are based upon the hitherto marked difference
between the sexes in nature, habits and tastes, and it is a
small minority that would quarrel with them. *
A NoTE or THE I=N OF CAsES iN WHICH TBZ DISCRIMINATION IS
M]nAD NOT BETWEEN TH3 SEX BUT THE COLOR OF CITIZENS.
On the continent of Europe it is
common for the railroads to reserve
cars for women who are traveling
alone, and in these the men are not
'permitted to travel. In all probability we should have the same
custom in this country were it not
for the greater respect which the
American pays to women, and also
that our larger cars, by reason of
their publicity, protect women from
insult. Such custom, however, has
existed and been adjudicated upon.
The New York Central Railroad
had made a regulation that one car
should be set apart for ladies and
for ladies and gentlemen, and
should be retained for that purpose
as long as people could get seats'in
the other cars. A placard was put
upon the car in the train which
plaintiff desired to take, stating
that it was so reserved, and a brakeman was stationed at the door with
oral instructions to give notice to
any gentleman unaccompanied by
a lady and to direct him to another
cur. Plaintiff attempted to enter
the car, when he was informed by
the brakeman that it was reserved,
and requested to take another car.
Plaintiff, notwithstanding this, en'tered the car, from which he was
forcibly ejected by the brakeman.
An action to recover damages was
brought. FOLGER, J. : It was a
reasonable regulation for'the de-

fendant to make that one car
should be set apart, in the first
instance, for females traveling
alone or with male relatiies orfriends. It tended to their comfort
and security and to the preservation
of good order, which it is a duty of
a carrier of passengers to be vigilant in seeking. As they had the
right to make the regulation, so
they had the right to enforce it,
even to the extent of removing
from that car a vnale person who
enterd it with no female under
his care: Peck v. N. Y. C. &. H.
R. R. R. CO., 7o N. Y., 587; C. &
N. W. R. R. v. Williams, 55 Ill.,
i85.

It is ntnecessary to cite any further examples of classification upon
a sex basis. The language of the
court may be, and is, applied to all
such classifications, whether they
occur on a train, in a station, i
restaurant, a hotel,. or a school or
college. If it tend to the pireservation of good order, the sense of the
community accepts it and raises no
question about equal rights, because equal rights are not thereby
assailed.
In an examination of decisions
where the classification is upon a
color basis, the doctrine of certain
school cases is pertinent to notice.
The plaintiff applied for a writ
of mandamus against the local
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between the children of both
school directors and teacher, in a
sub-district of a township, to admit classes the plaintiff had no claim.
"Nor can he dictate where his
the children of the plaintiff-to the
privileges of a specific district children shall be instructed, or
school. The school was for whites; what teacher shall perform that
children were office, without obtaining privileges
the plaintiff's
not enjoyed by white citizens.
an available
was
colored. There
school for colored children, admit- Equality of rights does not involve
tedly equal to the white schools- the necessity of educating white
and colored persons in the same
The defendants claimed that they
school, any more than it does that
the
that
might properly insist
plaintiff's children be educated in of educating children of both
sexes in the same school, or thit
the school eqtablished for colored
different grades of scholars must
children, and that they rightfully
be kept in the same school:" The
in
the
instruction
the
them
refused
State of Ohio ex rel. William
school for white children. Under
Games v. John W. McCinn and
the constitution and laws of the
State, the right to classify the others, 21 Ohio St., 198 (1871); Van
youth of the State for school pur- Camp v. the Board of Education of
Logan, 9 Ohio St., 406 (1859);
poses, on the basis of color, and to
Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush.,
for
schools
separate
4hem
assign
x98 (1849); Dallas v. Fosdick, 4o
education, had been long estabHow. Pr., '249 (1869); State of
such
claimed
plaintiff
The
lished.
classification contravened the pio- Nevad7a ex rcl., Stoutmeyer v. Duff
visions of the Fourteenth Amend- et al., Nevada, 342 (1872) ; People
ment of the Constitution of the ex tel. Dietz v. Easton, 13 -Abb.'
United States: "All persons born Pr. (N. S.), x59 (1872) ; Cory et dl.
v. Carter, 48 Ind., 327 (x874).
or naturalized in the United States,
Petition for mandamus, setting
and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United -forth that plaintiff; being 12 years
States and of the State wherein *old, had applied for admission to
they reside. No State shall make the grammar school in lierneighborhood, and that the defendants
or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immuni- refused to admit or receive her as
a pupil, but illegally excluded her
ties of citizens of the United States
The defendants in
nor shall any State deprive any therefrom.
admitted the stateanswer
their
person of life, liberty or property
without due process -of law, nor ments of birth, age, application,
deny to any person within its juris- refusal,' etc., and averred that the
diction the equal protection of the plaintiff belonged to the colored
laws." The Court held that this race. That since the organization
amendment did not make the State of the *school district there had
law unconstitutional, but only af- been and was a separate school for
forded to colored citizens an addi- colored children, in a comfortable
tional guaranty of equality of building, with proper furniture .and
rights to those already secured by provided with a competent teacher.
the constitution of the State. If That plaintiff had attended said
school for colored children up to
the law worked no substantial
the time she demanded admission
inequality of school privileges
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to the grammar school. That
before this suit was brought they
proposed to the plaintiff's father
to create a grammar class in said
colored school for the instruction
of the plaintiff, and to put in
charge thereof a competent teacher.
That public interest in said district
was opposed to the intermingling
of white and colored children in
the same schools, and the best
interests of both races required
them to be educated in separate
schools. The defendants also set
up that by the power to establish
schools, etc., and the discretionary
power in relation thereto given
them by the school law, they had
and have the right to require the
colored children to attend such
separate school.
Demurrer sustained. Appealed; affirmed. The
Court: "In view of the principle of
equal rights to all, upon which our
government- is founded, it would
seem necessary, in order to justify
a denial of such equality of right
to any one, that some express

sovereign authority for such denial
should be shown.

Now, under our

Constitution, which declares that
provision shall be made 'for the

education of all the youths- of the
State through a system of common
schools,' which constitutional declaration has been effectuated by
enactments providing for the ' instruction of youths between the
ages of five and twenty-one years,I

without regard to color or nationality, is it not equally clear that
all discretion is denied to the board
of school directors as to what
youths shall be admitted? It seems
to us that the proposition is too
clear to admit of question. We
conclude, therefore, that the law
makes no distinction whatever as
to the right of children between

the ages of five and twenty-one
years to attend the common
schools, and that there is no discretion left with or given to the
board of school directors to make
any distinction in regard to children within the specified ages.
Doubtless the board may, in its
discretion, fix the boundaries within which children must reside in
order to be entitled to admission to
a certain school.
"But this discretion is limited by
the line which fixes the equality of
right in all the youths below the
ages of five and twenty-one years.
If the words 'colored race' be
stricken from the answer, and
the word 'English,' 'Irish,' or
'German,' inserted in their place,

it would present precisely the same
pirincifiles for our determination
as is now presented.
It was the
clear legal duty of the board of
directors resulting from this said
office to admit the plaintiff to said
school, and to equal privileges with
the other pupilstherein." WRIGHTi,
J., dissenting: "The language of
the statute, that, where a discretion
is left to an inferior tribunal the
writ of mandamus can only compel
it to act, and that it cannot control
this discretion, is but the recognition of the rule as it stood at common law. The duty to be performed
must be inperative, not discretionary. Now, if the foregoing opinion
had placed the affirmance of the
case upon the ground that it was
the right of the scholar to attend
the school provided for scholars in
the sub-division where she resided,
I should have been content. So,
too, if the scholar was so far advanced that she could not receive
proper instruction in the colored
school.
Upon either of these
grounds I could have concurred.
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I am not prepared to admit that
school directors have no discretion
in arranging the schools, provided,
of course, they have furnished them
the necessary and proper instruction. All have a right to attend
the common schools. And this is
what the Constitution ifitended to
secure. I cannot admit that the
refusal to admit this scholar into
this particular school was so wrongful as that the courts should interfere by mandamus. If she was allowed to attend a school in the
proper district, having the suitable
instruction furnished to others,
then I know of no principle upon
which she can complain. There is
no absolute legal right in a colored
child' to attend a white school
rather than one made up of children of African descent; just as
there is no such right in a white
child to attend a colored school.
The true inquiry is: Have all equal
school privileges?" Clark v. Board
of Directors. 24 Iowa, 266.
Commenting upon this line of
cases, Mr. Justice CuiFFORD (Hall
v. DeCuir, 95 U. S., 505) says: *"Age
and sex have always been marks of
classification in public schools,
throughoui the history of our country, and the Supreme Court of Nevada well held that the trustees of
the public schools in that State
might send colored children to one
school, and white children to another, or they might make any such
classification as they should deem
best, whether based on age, sex,
race, or any other reasonable existant condition:" State v. Duffy, 7
Nev., 342. It would seem, therefore, that the weight of authority
is against the decision in the Iowa
case.
It will now be seen that the same
line of discussion which the school

cases raise obtains in railroad and
steamboat companies; and that the
various views taken of the powers
of carriers are similar to those expressed concerning the discretion
of directors and trustees of publie
schools, of innkeepers, and controllers of other institutions.
The dates prefixed to the following cases should be noticed.
1861. Grines v.' McCandless, 5
Phila., 2.55.
Action of trespass
brought to recover damages for the
expulsion of the plaintiff from one
of the lines of passenger cars by
the defendant. The defendant relied for his justification on a regulation of the railroad company,
prohibiting the entrance of negroes
into the body of the cars, and confining them exclusively to the front
platform. The Court: "A corporation created for the carriage of
passengers certainly cannot refuse
arbitrarily to carry any man, or any
class of men, without laying itself
open to an action for damages.' It
may, however, lay down rules for
the comfort and convenience of
those whom it is bound to carry.
What rules are proper must necessarily be left to the discretion of the
corporation in the first instance,
subject to the control and supervision of the courts of justice.
When it becomes necessary to lay
down rules for the government
and association of men in public,
public sentiment must be consulted
with caution indeed, and not without some reluctance. And when a
nation suffers as ours does from the
misfortune of having two races
within its bosom, one long civilized
and the other emerging from the
shades" of barbarism, and each indelibly marked by diversities of
manners. There is much in the
relation between them which must
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be left to the lessons of experience
and the tribunal of public opinion,
which cannot be arbitrarily forced
or hastened without producing or
augmenting repulsion and antipathy. In the belief, then, that the
regulation now before us is a wise
one, or if not wise will work -its
own cure best when least molested,
we enter judgment for the defendant."
1865. Derry v. Lowry, 6 Phila.,
3o. The Court: "The important
question involved in this action is
the right claimed by conductors of
city passenger railways to refuse
passage to persons of color, and to
eject such persons from the cars of
which they-have charge, where entrance to the same is obtained
without their knowledge or consent.
There was no such regulation of the
-Lombard and South Street Passenger Railroad, but I instruct you as
a principle of law that the existence of such a by-law would not
avail the defendant. The logic of
events of the past four years has
in many respects dleared our via'ion. Verdict for plaintiff. Fifty
dollars damages."
1869. West Chester & Philaoelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa.
St.,2og. The Court: "It is admitted
no one can be excluded from carriage by a public carrier on account
of color.
"But thedefendants intheirpoint
asked the Court to say that if the
jury find that the seat which the
plaintiff was directed to take was
in all respects a comfortable, safe,
and convenient seat, not inferiorin
any of these respects to the one she
was directed to leave, she should
not recover. The case, therefore,
involves no assertion of the inferiority of the negro to the white
passenger, but, conceding his
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right to be carried on the same
footing with the white man, it assumes it to be not unreasonable to
assign places in the cars to passengers of each color. The ladies"
car is known upon every wellregulated railroad, implies no loss
of equal right on the part of the
excluded sex, and its propriety is
doubted by none. The right to
separate being clear in proper cases,
and it being the subject of sound"
regulation, the question remaining
to be considered is, whether there
is such a difference between the
white and the black races within
this State, resulting from nature,
law and custom, as malies it a
reasonable ground of separation.
The question is one of difference,
not of superiority or inferiority.
We are compelled to declare that,
at the time of the alleged injury,
there was that natural, legal and
customary difference between the
white and the black races which.
made their separation as passengers
in a public conveyaice the subject
of a sound regulation to secure
order, prormote comfort; preserve
the peace and .maintain the rights
both of carriers and passengers :"
RiEAD, J., dissents.
x867. Act of Legislature, P. L.
38: "Any railroad or railway
corporation' within this cominonwealth that shall exclude, or allow
to be excluded by their agents,
conductors or employees, from any
of their passengers cars, any person or persons on account of color
or race, or that shall refuse to carry
in- any of their cars thus set apart
any person or persons on account
of color or race, or that shall for
such reason compel or attempt to
compel any person or persons to
occupy any particular part of any
of their cars set apart for the ac-
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commodation of people as passengers, shall be liable in an action
of debt to the person thereby injured or aggrieved in the sum of
$500."

1878. Central R. R. New Jersey v. Green and wife, 86 Pa. St.,
421, 427: Debt for the alleged ex-

clusion of Mrs. Green from the
cars of defendants. The Court: "It
is very clear from the whole evidence on both, sides that Mrs.
Green, the plaintiff, was excluded
from the rear car of the train. The
brakeman gave no reason. Did
they exclude her because of her
color? The fact of smoking was
denied stoutly. The evidence is
clear that these persons were rerespectable, decent persons. Judgment for plaintiff in Court below
affirmed."

Mr. Justice PAxSON:

"The Act of March 22, 1867, P. T.
38, should receive a reasonable construction. It was manifestly intended to prevent railroad companies making distinctions between
passengers on account of race'or
color. But I do not think it was
intended to give them [colored persons] superior privileges, or to so
interfere with the reasonable police
arrangement of the railroad companies in operating their road and
moving their cars as to enable a
colored man to force himself into
a car where, by reason of such
police regulations, a white man
may not enter. An ordinary traveler takes his seat in such car as
may be pointed out to him by those
in charge of the train. He has a
right to a seat, but not to a seat in
any particular car. I am unable
to see that the mere fact of Mrs.
Green's exclusion was on account
of race or color. She was directed
to enter a car in which white persons were seated, and which was
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the equal in every respect of the
car from-which she was excluded."
(See same case in court below: 2
W. N. C., 590). Upon the construction of a similar statute, see
Railroad v. Brown, 17 Wallace,
4451887. Pamph. 1,., 130, 131, May
19: "Be it enacted, etc., that any
person, company, corporation, being ovner, lessee or manager of
any restaurant, hotel, railroad,
street railway, omnibus line, theatre, concert hall, dr place of entertainment or amusement, *who
shall refuse to accommodate, convey or admit any person or persons
on account of race or. color over
their lines, or into their hotel or
restaurant, theatre, concert hall or
place of amusement, shall, upon
conviction thereof, be guilty of a,
misdemeanor, and be 'punished by
a fine not less than $5o nor mord
than $ioo."
Commonwealth v. Oberbeck, reportedin the Evening Call,November 2r, 1889, page 2: The defendant, a restaurant keeper, had told
a colored customer, who hadseated
himself at a bar upon a stool, that
he must go back into the diinIgroom where he would be sirved.
The jury were instructed that the
question was :.Did the defendant
refuse to accommodate the customer? That refusal to serve in one
room does not necessarily mean
refusal to accommodate, and that
these facts were for them to find.
Verdict of fot guilty.
It is to be noted how much less
stringent the language of the act
of 1887 is compared with the earlier
quoted act of 1867. In the later
act nothing prevents separate accommodations being furnished,
whether by railroads or hotels, or
any other -public institution. The
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railroad must not exclude anyone from its line. That is'all. No
mention of cars or parts of cars is
made, and the -fine is $i instead of
$500.
In other States similar enactments may be found. In Mississippi (x888) and Louisiana (iS9o)
passengers may be classified by
cars or parts of cars. In Tennessee,
Arkansas, Texas, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida and Louisiana they
are required to provide separate
cars, of equal accommodation, for
whites and blacks. The statutes
are all within five years of each
other, ranging from 1887 to 1891,
and it need hardly be observed that
such a provision in Texas is most
wise. The geography and social
conditions of a country so wide
and various as the United States
necessarily cause wide .variatibns
between the laws of the several
sections. Georgia and South Carolina provide that no discrimination
shall be made by carriers on a color
basis. The difference between discrimination and classification is
lportant, and there is no lack of.
decisions that emphasize it.
Where a colored woman was refused admission to one part of a
steamboat plying between Savannah and Palatka, and directed to
another part of-the vessel affording
substantially the same accommodations, it was held that she had
no cause of action for such exclusion : Green v. City of Bridgeton,
9 Cent. L. J., 2o6.
Where a colored woman was forcibly excluded from the general
dinner table on a steamboat, and
'ordered to take her meals upon the
guards of the boat or in the pantry,
as was customary for colored passengers, the Court held that under
the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Civil Rights Bill of i866,which

guaranteed to colored persons the
right to make and enforce contracts, she had a right to the accommodations demanded. In this
case, however, the accommodations
set apart for blacks were obviously
/inferior: Coger v. Northwestern
Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa, 145.
By the rules and regulations of a
boat the plaintiff, a colored person,
was excluded from the cabin. The
regulation was averred to be rea
sonable. To this answer of defendant plaintiff demurred. Held,
that the demurrer was not well
taken. That the reasonableziess of
such regulation is a mixed question
of law and fact, to be found by the
jury on trial, under the instructions
of the Court, and cannot be determined on demurrer: Day v. Owen,
5 Mich., 520.
So, in accordance with the same
reasoning, when a colored woman
was roughly excluded from the
ladies' car and directed to ta1ke a
seat in a car setapart for men, it'
was held that a verdict of $2oo recovered by her against this company was not excessive: C. & N.
W. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 55 l., x85.
In certain of these cases questions regarding the Interstate Commerce regulations of Congress and
the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Civil Rights Bill are raised.
For opinions that -none of these
.enactments regard the police power
of common carriers to regulate the
manner in which they shall trahsport their passengers, see Green v.
City of Bridgeton, 9 Cent. L. J.,
p. 207; The Civil Rights Bill, i
Hughes, 541, pp. 546-550; Hall v.

De Cuir, 95 U. S., pp. 506-508;
Gray v. Cincinnati Southern R.
Co., ix Fed. Rep., 68s-686; Smoot
v. Kentucky Central Ry. Co., x3
Fed. Rep., 341-344.
This police power of carriers to
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regulate their transportation for
the best convenience and safety of
all passengers is vested in them by
common law, and they are entitled
to make suitable regulations:
SHAw,C. J., in Commonwealth v..
Power, 7 Mete., 6oi; E ibbard v,.
Erie Railroad Co., 15 N. Y., 455;
Miner's Central Railroad Co. v.
V1ittemore, 43 Ill., 520. They are
in a condition somewhat similar to
thht of an innkeeper, whpse premises are open to all guests, but who
is not only empowered to make such
proper arrangements as will promote his own interests, but bound
to regulate the house so as to preserve order, and, ifpracticable, prevent breaches of the peace: Vinton
v. Middlesex Railroaa Co.,It Allen,
304; Peuna. R. R. Co. v.Langdon,
.92 Pa. St., 21.
Council 7v.W. & A. Ry.Co., i
Interstate Com. Rep., 638. Colored
plaintiff was ejected from defendant's car and forced to ride in an
inferior one, being struck and
bruised on his refusal to change
his quarters. Opinion: There was
in the train no car furnishing the
accommodations' for which the
complainant had paid and was entitled to have other than the 'one
from which he was removed because he was a colored man. In
denying to complainant equal ac.commodations permitted the other
passengers paying the same fare.
the railroad company subjected
him to undue prejudice and unreasonable disadvanthge, in violation of the act to regulate commerce.
Heard v. Georgia R. R. Co., r
Interstate Com. Rep., 719. Petitioner, a colored minister of the
Gospel, purchased a first-class
through ticket. Hewas obliged to
travel in an inferior car. Opinion:
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It is not with sole regard to the
wishes"or conceptions of ideal justice of colored persons, nor only
with deference to the prejudices or
abstract 'convictions of white persons that a practical adjustment is
to be reached, but with enlighteaned
regard to 'the best interests and
harmonious relations of bot.
It
being manifest upon the facts of
this case that by the-discrimination
between white and colored passengers, and the accommodations
furnished to colored passengers,
the petitioner was subjectedto unjust prejudice and disadvantage
in violation of the statute, the duty
of the- commission might be re.
garded as performed in so deciding.
But if a public sentiment exists in the. State of Georgia and in
some other States where the colored populatioAi is proportionately
large, that renders separation of
passengers on the ground of color
expedient, either, as a safeguard
againsi disturbance or for, other
good reasons, it is obvious that the"
cars for the two colors should .ia
equal in their comforts and accomu
modations, and that colored travelers should have no occasion for
contrastingunfavorably their mode
of transportation.with that of white
travelers in the. same train when
both pay a same price for darriage.
The order of the commission, on
the facts of the case, is that the
Georgia Railroad Company, by
requiring the petitioner to occupy
a seat in, a7 half car, deficient in
comforts and conveniences, subjected him to undue prejudice and
disadvantage -in violation of the
third section of the act to regulate commerce and that the said
railroad company cease and desist
from subjecting colored passengers
to such undue and unreasonable
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prejudice and disadvantage, and
that so long as its rule of separating passengers is maintained, its
duty is to furnish for all passengers
paying the same fare cars in all
respects equal and provided with
the same comforts, accommodations and protection for traveleis.
On the point that a law forbidding a steamboat company from
providing separate accommodations for whites and blacks is a
restriction of commerce between
the States, see Hall v. De Cuir, 95
U. S., 485.
The above line of cases, taken
from before 1861 until 1893, sets
forth very clearly the history of a
national prejudice, and our progressfrom an inhuman and unenlightened attitude throughanoversentimental attempt to correct this
(1867-i87O), resulting in statutes
and decisions which "practically
(as Judge PAXSoN pointed out)
gave the blacks superior rights, lo
a poised and temperate level of
common-sense, in'which the courts
most usually declare that in any
community where the relations
between the two races are of such

a character that a compulsory herding of them together is likely to
result in breaches of the peace or
discomfort, in such circumstances
it is wise and proper that they
should have equally good but separate accommodations.
The legal propositid ns upon
which this view depends are:
(1) A railroad companyr has the
common law right as a zarrier to
make reasonable regulitions regarding and controlling [the management and transportaLon of its
passengers; and whethet any particular regulation so ma.1 e is or is
not a reasonable one, i a mixed
question of law and fact.
*
(2) A regulation providing separate and equal accommo ations for
whites and blacks is a leasonable
one,.if the social conditions of the
district make separatio in trains,
boats, etc., advisable.
(3) Theaccommodati nsmustbe
equal in convenience aId comfort.
(4) The Fourth Ame dment and
the Civil Rights Bill-do iiot affect or
concern this police power of com
mon carriers.
. OW N WiSTZR.

